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Abstract This essay studies the semantic properties of what I call Russell-names.
Russell-names bear intimate semantic relations with descriptive conditions, in conso-
nance with the main tenets of descriptivism. Yet, they are endowed with the semantic
properties attributed to ordinary proper names by Millianism: they are rigid and
non-indexical devices of direct reference. This is not an essay in natural language
semantics, and remains deliberately neutral with respect to the question whether any
among the expressions we ordinarily classify as proper names behave as Russell-
names. Its aim is rather that of casting a new light on the traditional debate about
descriptivism on the one hand, and, on the other, what is commonly understood as a
radically anti-descriptivist approach. From the viewpoint of descriptivism, the con-
ceivability of Russell-names provides welcome relief from the pressure exerted by
considerations at odds with a flaccid and/or indexical treatment of proper names.
Conversely, from a Millian standpoint, the conceivability of Russell-names indicates
that the Millian stance, far from providing a meagre picture of names as ‘mere tags’,
is at least in principle consistent with the recognition of their semantic bonds with
richer descriptive material. The Appendix provides a formal treatment of Russell-
names within a model theoretic semantics for indexical intensional languages,
developed within an original ‘double-context’ framework.
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This essay is devoted to the discussion of expressions of a particular, and, as far as I
can tell, not previously discussed type. I call them Russell-names.
The occurrence of ‘Russell’ in ‘Russell-name’ is an allusion to certain aspects of
Bertrand Russell’s theory of names, which have provided the initial inspiration for my
project—first and foremost, his idea that ‘ordinary proper names’ are abbreviations
of definite descriptions.1 Admittedly, this ‘initial inspiration’ yields me to conclu-
sions that bear little resemblance with anything Russell may have wished to say about
ordinary names, or for that matter about any other expression. But my aims here are
neither historical nor exegetical: rather, my superficial homage to Russell serves as
a reminder of the descriptivist aspects in his analysis of proper names, which, in a
sense that will hopefully become clearer as I proceed, continue to reverberate in my
treatment of Russell-names.2
My initial gesture towards the descriptive dimension of Russell-names is meant to
provide a noteworthy contrast with the other part of the moniker I have chosen for
my concoctions: Russell-names deserve the label ‘names’ because they are intended
to conform to what I take to be the fundamental semantic properties of proper names,
namely their rigidity, direct-referentiality, and non-indexicality. These are admittedly
not properties that everybody happily attributes to proper names. Yet, my aim here
is not that of defending my own views about names: in principle, what I propose
remains consistent with the notions that none, some, or perhaps all among the expres-
sions commonly classified as names are Russell-names. Still, my point is also not
that of a mere formal exercise, with no bearing on the current debate on proper
names: although, in a sense, my treatment of Russell-names follows unashamedly
descriptive lines, these expressions do nevertheless conform to the semantic pattern
customarily associated with traditionally rabidly anti-descriptivist approaches, first
and foremost my favourite Millian treatment of names as rigid and non-indexical
referential devices.3
1See for instance [40, 41] and [42].
2The form of descriptivism at issue in what follows strikes me as Russellian also because of its insis-
tence on certain semantically relevant relationships between our respective explananda (ordinary names in
Russell’s case, Russell-names in mine) and descriptively well-endowed expressions—as opposed to, say,
Frege-inspired descriptive senses. The apparatus I put forth in what follows may nevertheless be amenable
to developments and amendments consistent with a variety of alternative versions of the descriptivist
standpoint. An unrelated historical note is also appropriate at this stage: although I (loosely) follow some
of Russell’s insights about the relationships between names and descriptions, I take on board without fur-
ther ado a relatively non-Russellian approach to the latter (see Section 2); an analysis closer to the letter
of Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions should nevertheless be easily derivable from what I write,
with opportune modifications and adjustments.
3In the previous paragraph, I described my views on proper names as also committed to the idea that these
expressions are devices of direct reference. Direct reference is a position within the framework of so-
called propositional semantics, namely the notion that sentences containing occurrences of proper names
express singular propositions. Since (i) the main ideas in what follows may be presented from the simpler
and more familiar viewpoint of an intensional semantics for indexical languages, and (ii) these ideas may
easily be rephrased in propositional terms, the notion of direct-reference remains in the background in
my exposition, and is relegated to a few footnotes (see in particular footnotes 10, 12, 16, and 19). For
considerations on the relationships between direct reference and rigidity see [9, 21, 22, 27, 38, 43, 44] and
[28].
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When it comes to proper names, then, my conclusion is ecumenical. From the
viewpoint of descriptivism, the conceivability of Russell-names provides welcome
relief from the pressure exerted by considerations at odds with a flaccid and/or index-
ical treatment of proper names: even if the arguments in favour of Millianism are
on the right track, so I conclude, not all versions of descriptivism should thereby
be abandoned. Conversely, from a Millian standpoint, the conceivability of Russell-
names indicates that the Millian stance, far from providing a meagre picture of names
as ‘mere tags’, is at least in principle consistent with the recognition of their seman-
tic bonds with richer descriptive material: the conclusion that certain expressions are
non-indexical devices of rigid designation does not entail a picture in which their
semantic properties are exhausted by their referential profile.
The first three sections of this essay are devoted to a preliminary informal
introduction of the main ideas guiding my treatment of Russell-names: the notion
of ‘abbreviation’, the sense in which Russell-names are ‘associated with’ definite
descriptions, and the double-context framework I develop for their semantic anal-
ysis. Sections 4, 5, and 6 provide a more rigorous formal presentation of these
ideas, and of their consequences for the relationships between descriptivism and
Millianism. The Appendix puts forth a simple artificial language as a test study
for the model-theoretic development of my double-context semantics, and as a pre-
sentation of the formal properties of the main concepts introduced throughout this
essay.
1 Preliminaries A: Abbreviations and Associations
As far as I can tell, Russell is not particularly explicit when it comes to the relation-
ship of abbreviation allegedly holding between ordinary proper names and definite
descriptions. In my Russell-inspired account, the idea of abbreviation is glossed in
terms of a certain relationship between (i) utterances of sentences involving Russell-
names and (ii) certain syntactic constructs appropriate for their semantic evaluation.
This section is devoted to an informal explanation of the sort of relationship I have
in mind, and of the sense in which the syntactic constructs mentioned in (ii) are
‘appropriate for’ the semantic evaluation of utterances of Russell-names. After a few
additional preliminaries in Sections 2 and 3, these ideas are studied in greater detail
in Section 4, before my official treatment of Russell-names in Section 5.
Consider a community of Russell-speakers, that is, a community of users of a
Russell-language involving Russell-names. The Appendix at the end of this essay
presents a simple fragment as an exemplar of a Russell-language, and discusses
its semantic properties from the viewpoint of the formal framework I introduce in
Section 3. At this initial stage, it is however pedagogically convenient to begin with
an informal sketch of a Russell-language, temporarily assumed to be indistinguish-
able from a simple fragment of ordinary English, with the possible exception of the
occurrence of Russell-names within its lexicon. In particular, I adopt as my Russell-
name of choice the expression ‘Bismarck’ (in italics, so as to distinguish it from the
ordinary proper name ‘Bismarck’), and I focus on a Russell-speaker’s utterance u1 of
(1) Bismarck was a conservative.
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This section continues with a preliminary discussion of what (1) abbreviates on
the occasion of u1, and of the sense in which the abbreviated construct provides the
basis for the semantic analysis of that utterance.4
As may already be apparent from my mention of ‘occasions of utterance’, the
choice of what is being abbreviated by (1) on the occasion of u1 is for me a context-
dependent business. In particular, I assume that an utterance u by a Russell-speaker is
suitably connected with an association a, and that the abbreviation appropriate on the
occasion for u depends on the properties of its connected association a. The details
in the informal idea of a ‘connection’ are of no immediate relevance at this stage, and
their discussion may safely be relegated to a few footnotes.5 As for the target of the
connection-relation, the following informal understanding of associations suffices for
the purpose of this introduction (see Section 4 for a more detailed presentation).
Informally, think of an association as an utterance of a sentence of the form: let
Russell-name r be associated with description d.6 In particular, taking inspiration
from Russell’s treatment of the ordinary proper name ‘Bismarck’, suppose that the
aforementioned utterance u1 is connected with the association: let the Russell-name
‘Bismarck’ be associated with the description ‘the first Chancellor of the German
Empire’. I refer to d, in this case ‘the first Chancellor of the German Empire’, as the
associated description for the Russell-name r , here ‘Bismarck’, as it occurs on that
occasion.7
Let then Sr be a sentence containing occurrences of a Russell-name r , and let ur
be an utterance of Sr with d as r’s associated description. I take Sr , as it occurs on that
occasion, to be the abbreviation of a sentence resulting from substituting each occur-
rence of r in Sr with an expression ‘involving’ d, in a sense of ‘involvement’ more
fully investigated as I proceed. So, the sentence (1), as uttered in the aforementioned
circumstances for u1, is the abbreviation of a construct of the form
(2) ... the first Chancellor of the German Empire was a conservative,
that is, it is the abbreviation of the result of substituting the occurrence of ‘Bismarck’
in (1) with an expression involving the description associated with that Russell-name
on that occasion.
4I proceed by focusing on examples involving occurrence of one Russell-name; my comments are easily
generalizable to more complex instances.
5See footnotes 7 and 24.
6Given appropriate conditions—I leave aside the interesting but semantically tangential issues pertaining
to the type of speech act at issue in the case of associations, and of the requirements for its felicitous
performance.
7Taking this scenario as exemplar, the following two families of approaches to the idea of connection
(possibly among others) remain compatible with the approach I pursue in this essay. (i) According to a
subjectivist view, connections are affairs within the speaker’s mental domain, as in a Russell-speaker’s rec-
ollection, when using ‘Bismarck’, of her previous decision to associate any future token of that expression
with ‘the first Chancellor of the German Empire’. (ii) According to a deferential alternative I find more
palatable, a Russell-speaker’s utterance of ‘Bismarck’ is connected with a possibly distant event, such as
someone’s association of ‘Bismarck’ with ‘the first Chancellor of the German Empire’, for instance due to
that utterance’s position within a wider socio-linguistic network, or its occurrence within a ‘chain of trans-
mission’ originating with that association. Deferentialists may do worse than studying the considerable
debate on the so-called ‘Causal Theory’ of proper names—see among many [9, 11, 13–15, 25] and [10].
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Since u1 is an utterance of a sentence containing a Russell-name, its semantic
profile ought to reflect the sort of semantic properties that I have assumed to be appro-
priate for these expressions. In particular, u1 ought to bear properties consistent with
a rigid and non-indexical approach to ‘Bismarck’, in agreement with my assumption
that Russell-names conform to the Millian pattern for ordinary proper names. Since I
have also anticipated that the semantic properties of u1 depend on the semantic inter-
pretation of what is being abbreviated on that occasion, this much imposes important
constraints on the completion of (2): what is desired is a sentence which, if suit-
ably interpreted, is able to render the sort of verdicts I expect to be appropriate for
u1. Accordingly, the next two sections sketch a slightly more accurate presentation
of what is being abbreviated by a Russell-speaker’s utterance, and of the semantic
resources needed for its interpretation.
Section 2 begins with a brief discussion of an initially promising but ultimately
inadequate strategy: the idea that constructs such as (2) are to be developed by embed-
ding the definite description, in this case the associated description for ‘Bismarck’,
within the scope of the operator ‘dthat’. Though inadequate, this dthat-gambit pro-
vides a pedagogically useful term of contrast with my own proposal, informally
introduced in Section 3 and more fully investigated in the second half of this essay.
2 Preliminaries B: Rigidity and the Dthat-Gambit
Take then (1) again, and my incomplete presentation of what it abbreviates on the
occasion of u1:
(1) Bismarck was a conservative.
(2) ... the first Chancellor of the German Empire was a conservative.
As mentioned above, the relation of abbreviation is of semantic relevance, in the
sense that the semantic properties of an utterance are to be derived from the interpre-
tation of what is being abbreviated on that occasion. A more detailed explanation of
this idea will have to wait until Section 4, after the discussion of certain subtleties
that are best left aside at this stage. Still, even now, it ought to be sufficiently clear
that the ellipsis at the beginning of (2) may not be understood as a typographically
idle flourish. In other words: it ought to be sufficiently clear that what is being abbre-
viated on the occasion for u1 is not simply what results from substituting ‘Bismarck’
with its associated description, as in
(3) the first Chancellor of the German Empire was a conservative.
This is so because, at least given a standard approach to the expressions in (3),
this sentence is endowed with properties I have assumed to be inappropriate in the
case of u1, first and foremost, as I explain in what follows, its flaccid (non-rigid)
propensities.
Since rigidity is a modal notion, I briefly rehearse these familiar considerations
by appealing to the standard framework for intensional semantics. In this framework,
an expression e is associated with an intension [[e]], in turn understood as a function
yielding a semantic value (extension) [[e]](w) with respect to a point of evaluation
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w.8 Leaving aside as obvious or irrelevant the details pertaining to the interpretation
of the verb-phrase in (3), the following hypothesis regarding the intension of the
expression in subject position suffices for my purposes: for any definite description
d of the form the F,
[[d]] = the intension f such that, for any point w, f (w) = the unique i ∈ [[F ]]w
if any such exists, where [[e]]w is a more familiar typographical format for [[e]](w).9
As a result, given further obvious semantic clauses, (3) turns out to be true or false
with respect to w depending on the political convictions of whoever first served as
German Chancellor at w, in contrast with the rigid reading assumed as appropriate
for (1).
As far as I can tell, something along the lines of (3) may well have been the sort
of abbreviation Russell had in mind for sentences containing the ordinary proper
name ‘Bismarck’. In all likelihood, then, the search for a non-trivial completion of
(2) abandons the letter of Russell’s descriptivism, and at best pursues what may
vaguely be described as a ‘Russell-inspired’ take on Russell-names. Still, Russel-
lian exegesis aside, the notion that ordinary proper names may be regimented as
constructs properly including a definite description has played a prominent role
in the contemporary debate between descriptivism and Millianism (and, for that
matter, between descriptivism and alternative non-descriptivist viewpoints). Among
different options, a particular strategy in this vein deserves to be mentioned at this
stage.
According to the view I have in mind, the semantics of proper names is appropri-
ately reflected by certain artificial constructs properly involving definite descriptions:
dthat-terms. The semantics for dthat-terms appeals to an apparatus richer than the
simple intensional system sketched above, the framework of so-called double-index
semantics for indexical intensional languages.10 According to the double-index
approach, an expression e is assigned an intension [[e]]c with respect to a context c,
typically represented as an n-tuple including a speaker ca , a time ct , and a possible
world cw.11 Consequently, the assignment of semantic values becomes a doubly-
relativized affair: [[e]]c(w), or more concisely [[e]]c,w, is the semantic value of e
8Throughout these informal sections, I leave aside questions having to do with the relativisation of seman-
tic values to models (see Appendix). For the sake of typographical simplicity, I also eschew mention of
assignments of values to variables: my treatment of definite descriptions is easily adaptable to more cus-
tomary approaches to ‘the’ as a quantifier, as in ‘the x: Fx’ (for an overview, see [30]). I also tend to think
of points of evaluation merely as possible worlds, but no significant issues arise from alternative accounts
(see [21] for a view of points as world-time pairs, and [24] for richer formats).
9For reasons of space, I hereinafter simply leave aside issues of non-existence and/or non-uniqueness, and
I proceed by leaving the caveat ‘if any such exists’ as implicit throughout my informal considerations in
the main body of this essay.
10As noted in [22], ‘dthat’ has been ambiguously introduced in [21]. Given my focus on intensional seman-
tics, it is the so-called ‘rigidifying operator’ interpretation that comes to the foreground in the main text of
this essay—see footnote 12 for considerations from the viewpoint of propositional semantics.
11The characterization of ca as the ‘speaker’ is (here harmlessly) sloppy, see [21]. In my Appendix, I
simplify my exposition by restricting contexts to two parameters, an agent and a possible world.
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with respect to a context c and a point of evaluation w. Then, given a description d
of the form the F,
[[dthat(d)]]c = the intension f such that, for any point w, f (w)
= the unique i ∈ [[F ]]c,cw.
As a result, given a few obvious further hypotheses,
(4) dthat(the first Chancellor of the German Empire) was a conservative
ends up being true or false with respect to a context c and a point of evaluation w iff,
given the way things went ‘in’ cw, the class of conservatives in w includes whoever
served as German chancellor in cw—in the case of ‘our context’, it ends up being true
with respect to a point w iff, in w, Otto von Bismarck pursued a right-wing political
agenda.12
Given my focus in this essay, I can afford to remain indifferent to the question
whether anything resembling this dthat-gambit paves the way for a satisfactory treat-
ment of ordinary proper names.13 As for Russell-names, the idea that (4) is what is
being abbreviated by (1) on the occasion in which u1 takes place is a non-starter.
This is so because Russell-names are intended to conform to the semantic properties
that Millianism attributes to names, and because for a Millian (and for that matter for
a considerable number of non-Millians) proper names are not indexical expressions.
Yet, as reflected by my mention of ‘our context’ in the gloss for (4), dthat-terms are
indexical, in the sense that they are associated with different intensions with respect
to different contexts. As a result, silently taking on board the obvious compositional
clauses for (4), [[(4)]]c1 may be a different intension from [[(4)]]c2 even if c1w and
c2w agree when it comes to the class of conservatives, as long as different individuals
serve as first German Chancellors in those circumstances.14
Still, its shortcomings notwithstanding, the dthat-gambit summarized in this
section indirectly hints at an intriguing formal stratagem. As I explain in the
next section, given certain important modifications, this ploy paves the way for a
double-context framework in which Russell-names conform to the desired Millian
constraints.
12Within so-called propositional semantics, sentences are associated with a structured content (with
respect to a context), typically represented as an n-tuple consisting of the contents of the expressions
occurring in them (see for instance [44]). The contribution offered by a directly referential expression to
the content of a sentence in which it occurs is customarily characterized as ‘an individual’, and the cor-
responding contents are described as singular (see [16] for introductory considerations). According to
Kaplan’s allegedly ‘intended’ view of ‘dthat’ as a device of direct reference, the content of dthat(d) (at c)
is the unique individual who satisfies d at cw (see [21] and [22]).
13For discussions of rigidifying strategies in the vicinity of the dthat-gambit, see among many [6, 21, 22,
33, 34, 38, 43, 45–48] and [7]. Rigidifying mechanisms of this sort also typically (though not inevitably)
play a role in the increasingly fashionable neo-descriptivist positions roughly inspired by [5] (for different
versions, see for instance [1, 2, 12, 17, 23] and [29]). For an interestingly idiosyncratic approach to rigidity
(of individual constants within a model-theoretically interpreted formal language) see also [18].
14Independently, of course, of any indexical element possibly introduced by the predicate, such as verbal
tense. For indexical views of names see [50] and [31]. For criticisms see [21, 22, 32, 35] and [36].
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3 Preliminaries C: Double-Context
Metaphorically speaking, ‘dthat’ neutralizes a definite description’s sensitivity
towards points of evaluation by anchoring its interpretation to an independent rela-
tum: [[(4)]]c yields Truth at a point w depending solely on the political allegiances
of cw’s Chancellor, regardless of the properties of the individual at the head of the
German government in w. This strategy may naturally be mirrored within the project
of a Millian treatment of Russell-names, as long as their associated descriptions are
interpreted not only independently of the peculiarities of this or that point of eval-
uation, but also independently of the parameters relevant for the interpretation of
indexical expressions. As I explain in what follows, this much invites a modification
of the double-index apparatus from Section 2 into a triply relativized affair—more
precisely, for reasons I am about to explain, into a framework in which points of
evaluation are accompanied by two contextual parameters.
Recall the informal idea of an association from Section 1, understood as some
sort of event in which a Russell-name is associated with a description. Being events
involving the use of language, associations take place within a particular setting: at
a certain time and in a particular possible world, someone establishes an appropriate
relationship between a Russell-name and a description. For reasons that will become
apparent as I proceed, a few features of this collection of parameters are worthy
of attention, and indirectly provide the intuitive background for my double-context
approach to Russell-languages.
These hints are perhaps most perspicuously explained by appealing to associa-
tions involving straightforwardly indexical expressions—and, for the sake of clarity,
a different exemplar of a Russell-name: ‘Napoleon’. Take then an utterance u5 of
(5) Napoleon is about to defeat Russia now
taking place in 1856. According to common consensus, the occurrence of ‘now’ in
this example is to be interpreted with respect to the context for u5, presumably a
context that includes the time of utterance as its temporal parameter. As a result, given
certain further obvious regularities, u5 is to be evaluated as true or false depending
on the outcome of the conflict in which Russia was involved in 1856, towards the end
of the Crimean War. Yet, suppose also that u5 is connected with an association that
appeals to an overtly indexical description, as in the association u6
(6) let ‘Napoleon’ be associated with ‘the Emperor of the French now’
taking place in 1815. It would seem to be in principle possible to suggest that the
interpretation of the indexical ‘now’ mentioned in (6) ought to be derived on the
basis of the context for u6, that is, a context with 1815 as its temporal co-ordinate.
In other words: it would seem to be in principle possible to demand that u5 be eval-
uated as true iff whoever was Emperor of the French in 1815 is about to defeat
Russia in 1856—that is, on the assumption that u5 and u6 take place in the actual
world, iff Napoleon I is within sight of a victorious conclusion to the Crimean
War.
I take this suggestion as a promising start for my account of Russell-names. What
it entails is a double-context apparatus, with one context, as usual, in charge of
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the interpretation of the indexical overtly appearing at the end of (5), and a dif-
ferent context devoted to identifying the individual determined by the association
of ‘Napoleon’ with the description in (6). I refer to the different roles played by
these contexts in terms of the distinction between contexts of interpretation and con-
texts of association. So (5), or more accurately what it abbreviates on the occasion
of u5,
. . . the Emperor of the French now is about to defeat Russia now,
demands to be interpreted by anchoring the occurrences of ‘now’ respectively to a
context of association k and a context of interpretation c, such that kt is the time of
u6, the association of ‘Napoleon’ with ‘the Emperor of the French now’, and ct is the
time at which u5 occurs.
I thus propose a double-context semantic framework for Russell-languages, in
which an expression e is assigned an intension [[e]]k,c with respect to a context
of association k and a context of interpretation c, and hence derivatively a seman-
tic value [[e]]k,c,w with respect to k, c, and a point of evaluation w. In turn, this
framework provides the resources needed for the modification of the dthat-gambit
to which I alluded at the beginning of this section. I implement this modification
in terms of an alternative to ‘dthat’, an operator ‘Rus’ defined along the follow-
ing lines: for any description d of the form ‘the F’, contexts k and c, and point of
evaluation w,
[[Rus(d)]]k,c = the intension f such that, for any w, f (w)
= the unique i ∈ [[F ]]k,c,kw.
Returning to my original example, and armed with the resources provided by the
double-context framework and by ‘Rus’, I then propose (7) as a completion of (2),
the sentence abbreviated by (1) on the circumstances of u1 (sentences repeated for
the sake of legibility):
(1) Bismarck was a conservative
(2) ... the first Chancellor of the German Empire was a conservative
(7) Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire) was a conservative.
Much remains to be said at this stage. The following sections are devoted to a more
rigorous presentation of the hints put forth thus far, and to an explanation of how
they provide the background for an analysis of Russell-names compatible with the
desiderata put forth at the beginning of this essay. In the next section, I return to the
idea of the association of a Russell-name with a definite description, now formally
regimented from the viewpoint of the double-context framework informally out-
lined in this section. In Section 5, I present the semantic properties of the constructs
relevant for the semantic evaluation of utterances of Russell-names, namely the Rus-
terms introduced above, and I explain how they manage to reflect the rigid and
non-indexical properties that warrant the occurrence of ‘name’ in ‘Russell-name’,
according to the Millian view of names. In Section 6, I conclude with the discus-
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sion of certain descriptivist features of Russell-names, and of a few related logical
consequences of my approach to Russell-languages.
4 Semantics A: Utterances and Expansions
According to the picture from Section 1, a Russell-speaker’s utterance of a sen-
tence containing occurrences of a Russell-name is connected with an association.
Accordingly, an utterance may formally be represented by coupling the traditional
sentence-context representation of utterances with an association, as in
u =<< S, c >, a >
where S is a sentence, c is a context, and a is an association.15 Since the
semantically relevant components of associations have to do with the pairing
of Russell-names with definite descriptions, I further formalize associations as
triples consisting of these expressions, side by side with an appropriate contextual
parameter. Continuing to focus for simplicity’s sake on scenarios involving occur-
rences of one Russell-name, then, an utterance is now formally understood as a
pair
(8) u =<< S, c >,< r, d, k >>
with S and c as above, r a Russell-name, d a description, and k a context. In an
informal gloss of this format, (8) expresses the idea of an utterance of S in a context
(of interpretation) c, connected with an association in a context (of association) k
of the Russell-name r with the description d. For instance, the utterance u1 from
Section 1 ends up being representable as the pair
(9) u1 =<<Bismarck was a conservative, c >,<Bismarck, the first Chancellor of
the German Empire, k >>
with c and k including the speaker, time, etc. appropriate respectively for that
utterance and for the association with which it is connected.
In these informal sections, my Russell-language of choice includes a few not fur-
ther analysed predicates (‘was a conservative’, ‘is about to defeat Russia now’), side
by side with a couple of Russell-names (‘Bismarck’, ‘Napoleon’; see the Appendix
for a more precise presentation of a formal Russell-language LR). I refer to the lan-
guage appropriate for the presentation of the constructs abbreviated by Russell-names
as that Russell-language’s expansion (in the Appendix, L∗R). In my presentation
thus far, such an expansion is deprived of Russell-names, but is endowed with a stock
of definite descriptions (‘the first Chancellor of the German Empire’, ‘the French
Emperor now’) and with the operator Rus. According to the idea of abbreviation
15For the formal understanding of ‘utterance’ as a sentence-context pair see [21]. The idea of association
is here formalized along lines appropriate for my simple examples involving occurrences of one Russell-
name—the generalization to instances with a plurality of these expressions is straightforward.
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described in Section 1, then, given an association < r , d, k >, a sentence S of a
Russell-language abbreviates a sentence S∗ of its expansion, where S∗ results from
S by substituting all occurrences of r in S with Rus(d). So, for instance, given the
association appropriate for u1, namely the association described by the second mem-
ber of (9), (1) abbreviates (7), the result of substituting ‘Bismarck’ with ‘Rus(the first
Chancellor of the German Empire)’.
Finally, let the expansion of an utterance u of the form (8) be the triple
u∗ =< S∗, c, k >
that is, the triple consisting of the sentence abbreviated by S on the occasion of u,
of the context of interpretation appropriate for u, and of the context for its connected
association. (‘Expansion’ thus ambiguously applies to languages and utterances, but
no confusion is likely to arise from this equivocation). In the case of u1, for instance,
its expansion is the triple
u1∗ =< Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire) was a conservative, c,
k >
with c and k as above.
In turn, these ideas provide the background for a more precise formulation of the
notion that the semantic interpretation of a Russell-speaker’s utterance ‘depends on’
the semantic properties of a certain description-involving construct. In particular, I
define a predicate ‘true’ for utterances of sentences in a Russell-language as follows:
given an utterance u whose expansion is u∗ =< S∗, c, k >,
(10) true(u) iff truec,k(S*),
given a not yet explained a predicate truec,k for sentences in the expansion of that
Russell-language.16 So, for example, u1 ends up being evaluated as true exactly on
the condition that (7) is truek,c, where k and c are as in (9).
The analysis of truec,k is the topic of the next section, devoted to the compositional
analysis of sentences in a Russell-language’s expansion. Since the characteristic
feature of this language has to do with the presence of Rus-terms, I focus my presen-
tation on the resources required for their interpretation, starting with the reflection
of the informal notion of ‘meaning’ within a double-context framework. The result-
ing distinction between the classic idea of character and what I call an expression’s
‘countenance’ leads me to the explanation of how Rus-terms, and hence deriva-
tively Russell-names, are endowed with constant characters and constant intentions,
consistently with the Millian demands of non-indexicality and rigidity. In Section
6, I conclude with the discussion of certain ‘logical’ properties ensuing from my
definition of truec,k , which in turn indirectly highlight certain properties of Russell-
languages and of their expansions that are particularly palatable from a descriptivist
viewpoint.
16Mutatis mutandis, a parallel strategy may be implemented for other semantic notions, such as the idea
of ‘content’ from the viewpoint of a propositional framework.
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5 Semantics B: Countenance and Character
In the standard framework for indexical languages, expressions are assigned a certain
primitive semantic property, character, formally understood as a function from con-
texts to intensions.17 So, the character {e} of an expression e is the function which,
given a context c as its argument, yields {e} (c), or, in the notation from Section 2,
[[e]]c, the intension of e with respect to c.18
In my double-context framework, on the other hand, what is endowed with a char-
acter is not an expression simpliciter, but a pair consisting of an expression and a
context (of association), as in: {e, k}, the character of e with respect to k. In particular,
as indicated above, Rus-terms are endowed with a certain character with respect to a
context k1, but with a possibly distinct character with respect to a different context
k2. For instance,
{Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire), k1}
is the constant character f1 such that, for any context c, f1(c) is the constant inten-
sion yielding the unique individual who served as the first Chancellor of the German
Empire in k1w. But
{Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire), k2}
is the distinct constant character f2 responsible for the constant intension concerned
with whoever preceded all other Imperial Chancellors in k2w.
From the viewpoint of double-context semantics, then, character is a derived
semantic property, systematically obtainable on the basis of a certain primitive prop-
erty of an expression, together with a context. I call this property of an expression
e its countenance, written as |e| and understood as a function from contexts (of
association) to characters. In particular,
|Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire)|
is the countenance g such that, for any context k, g(k) is the character {Rus(the
first Chancellor of the German Empire), k} of the kind described in the foregoing
paragraph.19
In the standard framework for indexical languages, sentences are assigned a
semantic-value (truth-value) with respect to a context and a point, according to
the customary compositional regularities—as in [[S]]c,w, the truth-value of S with
17I label this property as semantically ‘primitive’ in the sense that, in a classic framework for indexical
intensional languages, the character of an expression is a fundamental, non-derived property—in the case
of a model-theoretic approach to non-fully interpreted languages, a property that is attributed to non-
constant expressions by the model’s interpretation function, see [21].
18I borrow this notation from [21]; for comments on character see among others [3].
19From a propositional viewpoint, of course, the definition of ‘Rus’ is to be adapted so as to obtain results
consistent with the demands of direct referentiality, as in (roughly): for any k and c, the content of Rus(the
first Chancellor of the German Empire) is the unique individual {Rus(the first Chancellor of the German
Empire), k} (kw).
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respect to c and w. A singly relativized predicate truec is then standardly defined as
in
truec(S) iff [[S]]c,cw = T,
i.e., iff S is assigned the semantic value T with respect to c and the point determined
by c.20 Unsurprisingly, a similar move within a double-context framework yields
doubly-relativized truth-predicates, such as, in particular,
truek,c(S) iff [[S]]k,c,cw = T.
Swiftly adapting these remarks to the case of (7), repeated here
(7) Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire) was a conservative,
truek,c(7) iff (7) is assigned the semantic value T when evaluated with respect to
the contexts k and c and the point cw, that is, iff the first German Chancellor in kw
is such that he is a conservative in cw. Since, according to (10) from Section 4, an
utterance with < S∗, k, c > as its expansion is true iff truek,c(S∗), it follows that
u1, the utterance of (1) from Section 1, is true as long as whoever has been identified
as the first Chancellor of the German Empire in the context of association k is a
conservative at the possible world where u1 takes place. In other words, assuming
u1 to take place in the actual world, it follows that true(u1), since truec,k(7), that is,
since Otto von Bismarck was in fact a conservative.
As usual, the definition of a truth-predicate gives rise to corresponding ‘meaning-
grounded’ notions, as in the informal idea of a sentence’s being ‘true by virtue
of meaning alone’. Given the classic notion of truthc for indexical languages, for
instance, this idea is formally reflected in terms of truth by virtue of character alone,
that is, in terms of truthc for all c.21 Since the development of a double-context appa-
ratus engenders doubly-relativized predicates such as truek,c, a formal rendering of
the notion of ‘meaning guaranteed truth’ must then be cashed out in terms of ‘coun-
tenance guaranteed’ truth, that is, in terms of truthk,c for all k and c. After a few
further clarifications and developments, I devote the final section of this essay to a
preliminary study of some properties of this notion, in turn intended as an explo-
ration of certain descriptivists consequences of the idea of a Russell-name within a
double-context framework.
6 Semantics C: Countenance and Designation
Not unlike the eight-letter name-type ‘Bismarck’, the Russell-name-type ‘Bismarck’
is in itself deprived of a semantic profile: what constitute the objects of semantic
evaluation are, as common parlance puts it, ‘uses’ of these expressions. In the case
of Russell-names, what is of semantic interest is, in colloquial terms, ‘Bismarck’qua
20See [21] and [26].
21In the model theoretic analysis of the formal language LD in [21], this idea is developed in terms of
truth in all models and contexts, in turn labeled by Kaplan as analyticity.
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abbreviation of, say, ‘Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire)’, rather than of
‘Rus(the largest German battleship in 1940)’ or for that matter ‘Rus(the 1872Minister
President of Prussia)’.22 In the more theoretically laden terms from the foregoing
sections: what matters is ‘Bismarck’ as it occurs in an utterance connected with an
association involving, say, ‘the first Chancellor of the German Empire’, rather than
some other description.
Even with our attention firmly focused on the ‘first Chancellor’ scenario, ‘Bis-
marck’ is strictly speaking only indirectly endowed with a semantic profile. Indeed,
as hinted thus far and as more explicitly put forth in the Appendix, the immediate
objects of compositional evaluation are not Russell-languages but their expansions—
that is, languages deprived of Russell-names but equipped with Rus-terms in their
stead. Yet, given certain obvious background assumptions, a more direct and concise
presentation ought to remain intelligible as a harmless shorthand for the officially
authorized but cumbersome jargon. ‘Bismarck’, I write henceforth, is endowed with
the countenance
|Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire)|,
in the sense that utterances of ‘Bismarck’ in the by now familiar circumstances are
evaluated on the basis of the semantic properties of that Rus-term, along the lines
indicated thus far.
In an equally harmlessly colloquial sense, then, ‘Bismarck’ may be described as
designating an individual i with respect to a context (of association) k. In particular,
‘Bismarck’, as it occurs in u1, designatesk Otto von Bismarck in the sense that, in the
context of association k appropriate on that occasion,
|Rus(the first Chancellor of the German Empire| (k)
is a constant character concerned with that man. So, as indirectly indicated by this
relativisation of the designation-relation, Russell-names conform to the satisfactional
pattern characteristic of descriptivism: the relationship between ‘Bismarck’ and Bis-
marck is not semantically immediate, but results from the interaction between a
descriptive condition and the idiosyncrasies of this or that context.
Still, although the identification of a Russell-name’s designation is in a sense a
contextual business, it is clearly not a ‘contextual business’ in the sense of contextual-
ity appropriate for indexicality. Indeed, in consonance with the Millian requirements
put forth at the beginning of this essay, Russell-names are endowed with a constant
character, and persist in their relationship with a particular designatum across occa-
sions of utterance (or, as I put it, across contexts of interpretation). As a result, their
satisfactional requirements fail to interact with those of overtly indexical expressions.
Returning to example (5) from Section 3, for instance,
(5) Napoleon is about to defeat Russia now
22The former example is an allusion to the Garman battleship Bismarck, destroyed by the British fleet in
1941. The latter appeals to Otto von Bismarck’s role as Minister President of Prussia, roughly concomitant
with his position as Chancellor of the German Empire.
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may well truly be utterable as a description of a scenario in which, for no time t ,
whoever is French Emperor at t is in sight of victory over Russia at t , even on the
assumption of an association of ‘Napoleon’ with ‘the Emperor of the French now’—
see u6 in Section 3.
Accordingly, then, Russell-names display a particularly idiosyncratic satisfac-
tional pattern: though sensitive to the peculiarities of this or that context of
association, their designation remains non-indexically indifferent to contexts of
interpretation, and rigidly unconcerned with points of evaluation. In the double-
context apparatus put forth thus far, this pattern is implemented in terms of the
distinction between countenance and character: in the case of Russell-names (or,
more precisely, their representative Rus-terms), character is a derived semantic
property, obtainable on the basis of their countenance and of the choice of a par-
ticular context of association. As I am about to explain in the remainder of this
section, this distinction yields interesting semantic consequences, which at least
partly reflect the sense in which Russell-names conform to certain descriptivist
desiderata.
Unsurprisingly, a notorious type of example turns out to be particularly apt for
guiding my discussion of this topic: true identity statements such as, in the case of
ordinary proper names,
(11) Hesperus is Phosphorus
with ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ used qua names of Venus. From the viewpoint
of the standard framework for indexical intensional languages, the Millian treatment
of proper names entails that their semantic behaviour is fully reflected by a con-
stant character responsible for the identification of (a constant intension yielding)
what is commonly called its ‘referent’. Since, as mentioned, character is accordingly
understood as a non-derived reflection of an expression’s meaning, sentences such as
(11) end up being true by virtue of character, that is, true in some sort of ‘meaning
guaranteed’ way.23
The characteristically descriptive profile of Russell-names within the accom-
panying double-context apparatus is profitably highlighted by contrasting these
conclusion with the outcomes ensuing in parallel scenarios involving Russell-names.
Take for instance
(12) Hesperus is Phosphorus,
and assume that these Russell-names are associated with the obvious descriptive
material, say, respectively ‘the first object visible in the evening sky’ and ‘the last
object visible in the morning sky’. Given any context k such that kw is astronom-
ically sufficiently similar to the actual world, these Russell-names co-designatek.
More precisely, for any such k, the character
23As a result, the Millian commitments to rigidity and non-indexicality are commonly reflected in terms
of the slogans that the meaning of a name ‘is simply its bearer [39], i.e., that it is ‘the object to which it
refers’ (Braun [4]: 491).
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|Rus(the first object visible in the evening sky| (k)
is the very same character as
|Rus(the last object visible in the morning sky| (k),
namely the constant function yielding (a constant intension yielding) Venus at all
contexts. Accordingly, the identity claim in (12), or more precisely
(13) |Rus(the first object visible in the evening sky| = |Rus(the last object visible
in the morning sky|
is indeed once again recognized as true by virtue of character alone, in the sense that,
given a context of association k as above, truek,c(13) for all c. Yet, a conclusion of this
sort is hardly amenable to an informal gloss in terms of ‘meaning guaranteed’ truth:
as a result of the derivative status of character in a double-context framework, truth
by virtue of character is achieved not only on the basis of the conventional properties
of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ (and, of course, ‘is’), but also on the basis of the
peculiarities of k, the context of association I have chosen for my example. The sense
in which truth is inevitably obtained independently of the idiosyncratic aspects of
this or that context (and, of course, of this or that point of evaluation) is rather now
reflected by the idea of truthk,c for all k and c. And, clearly, for some k (and c), not
truek,c(13)—in particular, for any k such that, at kw, the heavenly body that appears
first in the evening sky is distinct from what lingers in the morning firmament.24
7 Conclusion
Are there occurrences of Russell-names in English? In this essay, I remained delib-
erately silent when it comes to this question. As a result, my conclusions remain
compatible with the ideas that (i) all expressions we commonly classify as proper
names are Russell-names, (ii) some of them are, or (iii) none of them are.
It is perhaps option (ii) that deserves particular attention from the viewpoint of
natural language semantics, at least given the recurrent suspicion that some expres-
sions commonly classified as proper names display idiosyncratic semantic properties
not shared by run-of-the mill, ‘prototypical’ names.25 Admittedly, in the absence of
24These conclusions (if flanked by a variety of independent considerations) may in turn be of relevance
for a family of issue in philosophical psychology and the philosophy of mind, commonly gathered under
the label of ‘cognitive value’. It is in this respect that the details in what I called the ‘connection’ relation
between utterances and associations may deserve a much more attentive and detailed treatment than the
highly tentative hints in footnote 7. Due to this essay’s focus on issues in truth-conditional semantics, I
leave these independently interesting issues as a topic for future developments of the idea of a Russell-
language, and of its relation with Russell-speakers.
25Some possibly promising areas of application may have to do with the various issues commonly sub-
sumed under the label of ‘descriptive names’ (see among many [11, 13–15, 19, 25, 48, 49] and [20]). A
distinct phenomenon perhaps amenable to a treatment grounded on the idea of Russell-names has to do
with so-called ‘names that have grown capitals’ (see Corazza [8] and Rabern [37]). These prima facie
applications of my apparatus will unquestionably need to be assessed in their own right, on the basis of
considerations independent of my assessment of the relationships between Millianism and descriptivism.
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arguments to this effect, option (iii) remains a possibility that should not be dismissed
off hand. Yet, if Russell-names turn out to be nothing more that a philosopher’s
concoction, they do so only on the basis of considerations independent of the core
Millian picture of proper names as rigidly non-indexical, and of the arguments typ-
ically presented in its defence. Conversely, considerations supporting (at least some
type of) a descriptivist approach to proper names may well lead Millians towards the
direction of (i), or at least (ii), with no embarrassment for their commitment to a non-
flaccid and non-indexical treatment of those expressions. The semantic admissibility
of Russell-names thus opens an interesting conceptual niche in the traditional divide
between Millian and descriptivist approaches to proper names, and paves the way for
a more fruitful dialogue between these traditionally incompatible stances.
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Appendix
(1) The Russell-Language L
LexiconL
1. A set ICL of individual constants
2. A set PRL of one-place predicates
3. The indexical i; the determiner the; the modal operator Nec
4. A set RNL of Russell-names
SyntaxL
• for any F ∈ PRL, the F is a descriptionL (DL)
• for any t such that t ∈ ICL∪ RNL∪ {i} ∪ DL, t is a termL
• and any termL t and F ∈ PRL, F(t)is a sentenceL
• for any sentenceL S, Nec(S) is a sentenceL
(2) The Expansion L*
LexiconL∗
• ICL∗ = ICL
• PRL∗ = PRL
• The indexical i; the determiner the; the modal operator Nec
• The operator Rus
SyntaxL∗ :
• for any F ∈ PRL∗ , the F is a descriptionL∗ (DL∗)
• for any d ∈ DL∗ , Rus(d) is a Rus-termL∗ (RTL∗)
• for any t such that t i ∈ ICL∗∪ {i} ∪ DL∗∪ RTL∗ , t is a termL∗
• for any termL∗ t and F ∈ PRL∗ , F(t) is a sentenceL∗
• for any sentenceL∗ S, Nec(S) is a sentenceL∗
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(3) Utterances, Associations, Expansions
• Let the class of contexts C be such that, for all c ∈ C, c =< ca , cw > , ca an
individual and cw a possible world
• For any d ∈ DL, r ∈ RNL, and k ∈ C, < r, d, k > is an associationL
• For any sentenceL S, c ∈ C, and associationL, a,the pair << S, c >, a > is
an utteranceL
• For any utteranceLu of the form << S, c >, a > , with a =< r, d, k >, the
expansion of u is the triple < S∗, c, k >, where S∗ is the sentenceL∗ resulting
from S by replacing occurrences of r with Rus(d)
(4) Semantics for L*: Models
A L*-model M is a quadruple <UM, WM, IM, CM > such that
• UM is a non-empty class of individuals
• WM is a non-empty class of possible worlds
• CM is a non-empty class of pairs < ca , cw >, with ca ∈ UM and cw ∈ WM
• IM is a function such that, for any c, k ∈ CM and w WM,
◦ for any a ∈ ICL∗ , IM(a) = a constant function f such that f (k) = a
constant function g such that g(c) = a constant function j such that
j (w) ∈ UM
◦ for any F ∈ PRL∗ , IM(F ) = a constant function f such that f (k) =
a constant function g such that g(c) = a function j such that j (w) ⊆
UM
(5) Semantics for L*: Countenance and Character
The countenance |e|M of an expression e of L∗ in a model M is a function such that,
for any c, k ∈ CM and w ∈ WM,
• for any a ∈ ICL∗ , |a|M = IM(a)
• for any F ∈ PRL∗ , |F |M = IM(F )
• |i|M = the constant function f such that f (k) = the function g such that
g(c) = the constant function j such that j (w) = ca
• for any F ∈ PRL∗ , |the F|M = the constant function f such that f (k) = the
constant function g such that g(c) = the function j such that j (w) = the
unique i ∈ UM such that |F|M(k)(c)(w) if such i exists, and † otherwise.26
• for any F ∈ PRL∗ , |Rus(the F)|M = the function f such that f (k) = the
constant function g such that g(c) = the constant function j such that j (w) =
the unique i ∈ UM such that |F|M(k)(c)(kw) if such i exists, and † otherwise.
• Notation: {e, k}M = |e|M(k) (the character in the model M of the
expressionL∗ e with respect to a context k)
(6) Semantics for L*: Semantic Value
26‘†is a completely alien entity, [not in] UM ..., which represents an ‘undefined’ value of the function’
(Kaplan 1977: 544). This solution is here adopted merely for the sake of illustration.
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• Notation: [[e]]Mk,c,w = {e, k}M(c)(w) (the semantic value in the model M of
the expressionL∗ e with respect to contexts k and c and possible world w)
• For any sentenceL∗ S of the form F(t), F ∈ PRL∗ and t a termL∗ , [[S]]Mk,c,w =
T iff [[t]]Mk,c,w ∈ [[F]]Mk,c,w
• For any sentenceL∗ S of the form Nec(S1), [[S]]Mk,c,w = T iff [[S1]]Mk,c,w∗ for
all w∗ ∈ WM
(7) Truth
• For any sentenceL∗ S and k, c ∈ CM , trueMk,c(S) iff [[S]]Mk,c,cw = T
• For any sentenceL∗ S, analytic(S) iff trueMk,c for all M and k, c ∈ CM• For any utteranceL u of the form < S, c>, <r, d, k>>, true(u) iff truec,k(S∗),
with c, r , d, k, and S∗ as in (3).
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